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INDIGENOUS LAW AND GENDER
IN SOUTH AFRICA:

TAKING HUMAN RIGHTS AND
CULTURAL DIVERSITY SERIOUSLY
Thandabantu Nhlapo"
I. Introduction
The history of indigenous law in South Africa has been one of
neglect, limited recognition and marginalization. Describing the
phenomenon, TW Bennett says:
It would be generous to attribute the want of attention to an
unconscious neglect; it is more probably the result of a deliberate
policy to exclude Africans from full participation in the South
African legal system!'
Both the colonial and settler states intervened in indigenous law
only when such intervention was deemed necessary to control the
African population or to advance some segregationist policy.' In
addition to official inattention, indigenous law was shunned, ironically,
by liberal anti-apartheid circles precisely because of its association in
their minds with apartheid politics. This was so because when the state
was not ignoring indigenous law, it was actively corrupting it (or
dishonestly enlisting it as a justification) for its own separatist ends.
The consequence of these factors was that the impression was created
that South Africa has one system of "real" law-the Roman-Dutch and
English common law-and some vaguely defined and unimportant code
of conduct popular with the "natives." This attitude found its way into

Department of Private Law, University of Cape Town.
'TW Bennett, A Source Book of African Customary Lawfor Southern Africa (1991) Juta & Co, Cape
Town, Preface, V.
2
See for example the Black Administration Act 38 of 1927 where, in addition to setting up a court
hierarchy for African litigants, there were other provisions criminalizing certain types of conduct.
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the law schools as well, where indigenous law is likely to be relegated
to the "phantom zone" in the curriculum, as DP Visser3 describes it.
The Native Administration Act 38 of 19274 consolidated the
different approaches adopted by the provinces towards indigenous law
and set up the "dual system" of laws that persists to the present day.
The Act created a separate system of courts for Africans;5 it
established the Governor-General as "Supreme Chief of all natives in
the Union"6 and gave him authority to appoint and demote traditional
leaders, 7 to deal with land' and to create tribes.9 The Act also
regulated the marriages of Africans, carefully distinguishing between
a "marriage" (meaning a civil marriage) and a "union" (referring to
African nuptials, not considered to be real marriages).
10
1986 saw the abolition of the Native Commissioner's Courts,
which had been established by the 1927 Act, in favor of a unified court
hierarchy in which the Chiefs and Headmen's Courts (also recognized
in the 1927 Act) now occupy the bottom rung in the legal hierarchy.
In the meantime indigenous law had been codified in KwaZulu and
Natal. " The Law of Evidence Amendment Act 45 of 1988,12
provided that indigenous law was applicable in all the courts of the
land, provided itwas easily ascertainable. 3

'DP Visser "The Role of Legal Education in the Internal Conflict of Laws" in AJGM Sanders (ed) The
Internal Conflict of Laws (1990) Butterworths Durban, 68.
4
Now the Black Administration Act. See note 2 supra.
'Chapter IV.
€'Section I.
'Section 2(8).
'Chapter 3.
'Section 5(l)(a): "The Governor-General may define the boundaries of the area of any tribe and may
from time to time alter the same and may divide any existing tribe into two or more parts or amalgamate
tribes or parts of tribes into one tribe or constitute a new tribe, as necessity or the good government of the
natives in his opinion require."
"By the Separate Courts for Blacks Abolition Act 34 of 1986.
"By the Natal and KwaZulu Codes: Proc RISI of 1987 and Act 16 of 1985 (Z), respectively.
"Section 1(l).
"This is an open invitation to apply the "official" version of customary law. See M Chanock, "State,
Law and Culture: Thinking about 'Customary Law' after Apartheid," 1991 Acta Juridica 53.
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With the introduction of the interim constitution14 the situation is
set to change drastically. The state can no longer ignore indigenous
law which is recognized explicitly in the constitution. Such recognition
is subject to other provisions of the constitution, especially those
guaranteeing fundamental rights. 5 Thus in section 33(2) and (3),
which set up the relationship between the fundamental rights and "any
law" including indigenous law, it is provided that indigenous law may
not limit a fundamental right; on the other hand the existence of a
fundamental right does not imply the denial of any other rights or
freedoms conferred by indigenous law "to the extent that they are not
inconsistent" with Chapter 3.
Section 35(3) stipulates that in
interpreting indigenous law the courts should have regard to the spirit
of the bill of rights and in section 126(1) provincial legislatures are
given concurrent competence with Parliament to make law with regard
16
to "indigenous and customary law.'
The explicit representation of the interests of traditional leaders in
the constitution underpins the importance of indigenous law. Section
181(1) and (2) recognize traditional authorities which observe "a
system of indigenous law," and renders that system subject to
"regulation by law"; Section 182 entitles traditional leaders of
communities "observing a system of indigenous law" to ex officio status
in local government. Ensuring that such arrangements will be carried
over into the final constitution, Constitutional Principle XIII 7 read
with section 71(1)(a) stipulate that indigenous law (subject to
fundamental rights and legislation) must be recognized together with
the institution of traditional leadership based on such law. In addition,

4
Passed in 1993 as the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act No. 200 of 1993 the interim
constitution came into effect on 27 April 1994. It stipulates that a final constitution must be adopted by
May 1996. The task is being undertaken by the 490 members of the House of Assembly and the Senate,
sitting as the Constitutional Assembly.
"5Chapter 3 contains a catalogue of the classical freedoms and entitlements of a democratic society
including the rights to life, human dignity, freedom of conscience, religion, belief, opinion, expression,
association, movement. This "bill of rights" and the constitution in general are to be enforced by a
Constitutional Court established in terms of section 98 of the Constitution.
"The words "indigenous" and "customary" may be used interchangeably, but see below.
"7 Schedule 4 of the Constitution. The Constitutional Principles represent the political agreements
concluded during the constitutional negotiations. In terms of these agreements the Constitutional Assembly
in drawing up the final constitution cannot depart from the thirty-four Principles set out in the Schedule.
They are the negotiated guidelines prescribing the form of the final constitution, are covering issues
ranging from the shape of the civil service to the system of elections.
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there is language in the interim constitution which protects the right of
South Africans to participate in the language and culture of their
choice. "
The cumulative effect of these constitutional provisions is clear.
Of the three options theoretically open to the constitution-makers: to
entrench customary law, to recognize customary law, or to abolish
it, 9 the path that was followed was to recognize customary law in
fairly strong terms. It is this author's contention that in view of
Constitutional Principle XIII and the amendments to section 126, such
recognition virtually amounts to entrenchment without requiring special
majorities for alterations to the status quo.
The indigenous "package" thus has a very strong presence in the
interim constitution; moreover, it has a guaranteed life in the final
constitution. This is so despite language in the interim constitution
subjecting indigenous law and culture to "fundamental rights," to
"regulation by law" and to "values underlying an open and democratic
society based on freedom and equality., 20 Indeed that is where the
problem lies: the constitution does not provide any guidelines for the
resolution of conflicts, should this clearly recognized system clash with
the countervailing modem values found in the same document,
especially in the bill of rights.
Many commentators have pointed out that the equality clause is set
for a head-on conflict with indigenous law. 2' Equality and nondiscrimination are specifically enshrined in section 8 of the Constitution
in the following terms:

"Thus section 31 acknowledges the right of people to their "cultural life"; Constitutional Principle XI
(read with section 71(l)(a) requires the final constitution to promote and protect the diversity of language
and culture; and the new Constitutional Principle XXXIV (inserted by Act 2 of 1994) acknowledges "tie
notion of the right of self-determination by any community sharing a common cultural and language
heritage" (subject only to the right of "South African people as a whole" to self-determination).
"'See C. Albertyn "Women and The Transistion to Democcracy in South Africa' 1994 Acta Juridica
39-63 at 57-60. Traditional leaders lobbied to entrench customary law, while women's groups advocated
the abolition of the customary law.
"2See Schedule 4 of the Constitution.
"See, for example, T.W. Bennett "Human Rights and the African Cultural Tradition" in W. Schmale
(ed.) Human Rights and Cultural Diversity, Keip Publishing, Goldbach, Germany (1993) 269; T.W.
Bennett Human Rights and African Customary Law Under the South African Constitution,Juta and Co.,
Cape Town (1995) 80; F. Kaganas and C. Murray "The Contest Between Culture and Gender Equality
Under South Africa's Interim Constitution," Journal of Law and Society (1994) 409.
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(1) Every person shall have the right to equality before the law
and to equal protection of the law.
(2) No person shall be unfairly discriminated against, directly or
indirectly, and, without derogating from the generality of this
provision, on one or more of the following grounds in particular:
race, gender, sex, ethnic or social origin, color, sexual orientation,
age, disability, religion, conscience, belief, culture or language.
Given South Africa's history of division and cultural diversity,
most challenges before the Constitutional Court are likely to arise from
this section. This will be an unprecedented reckoning of indigenous
law within the context of a written constitution and a bill of
fundamental rights. The exercise will be a new experience for South
Africans: courts, lawyers, policy makers and legislators will require
guidance as to how to proceed. It is to that effort that the present
paper seeks to contribute. But before that task is undertaken, closer
attention needs to be paid to the phenomenon of indigenous law itself.
II. Indigenous Law: An Attempt at Definition
Sometimes termed customary law, indigenous law is the system of
norms which governs the lives of millions of African people,
particularly (but, not exclusively) in the rural areas. It is a custombased system and its legitimacy lies largely in its claims to a direct link
with the past and with tradition. Nowadays it is accepted that
indigenous law has undergone profound changes through various kinds
of interaction with European culture and with both the colonial and
apartheid states. The process has led to the growth of "official"
customary law which consists of rigid rules, embedded in judicial
decisions and statutes, which have lost the characteristics of dynamism
and adaptability which distinguished African custom.
lain Currie summarizes the process well when he notes:
[I]ndigenous law had been corrupted into "customary" law, the
product of a long history of collaboration between colonial
administrators and indigenous elites and not the lived "folk" law it
claimed to be. Translation, codification and the application of
systems of precedent had created an ossified body of legal rules,
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reflecting the positivist proclivities of the institutions and personnel
charged with the supervision of indigenous law.22
The important point about the participation of African elites in this
process is also made forcefully by Martin Chanock, who writes of the
"new" customary rules in these terms:
...these rules represented a staking out of positions by a particular
section of African societies supported by the state. Customary law
not only embodied a view of a dominant portion of African
societies as to what the operative norms were, but also became,
when transformed into enforceable rules of positive law,
increasingly less "customary" in the face of economic and social
transformation."
African people, and African women in particular, were to feel the
effects of these transformations in gender relations as well. Caught
between the pressures exerted by colonialism on the pre-capitalist "sexgender, system"" and the latter's resistance of such pressures women
came off the worst. Cherryl Walker noted:
The incorporation of the indigenous people into the new social
order involved their active engagement with the invasive forces of
domination, as women and men struggled to defend their own
interests and wrest what they could from the new opportunities and
constraints. 25
She concludes that in the political and economic transformation of the
region "the organization of gender constituted a critical battleground:

22

lain Currie, "The Future of Customary Law: Lessons from the Lobolo Debate," 1994 Acta Juridica

146-168 at 146.

'3 Chanock, M. op cit Note 13, 55.
24
Cherryl Walker, "Women and Gender in Southern Africa to 1945: an overview" in C Walker (ed),
Women and Gender in Southern Africa to 1945 David Philip, Cape Town I, citing Gayle Rubin's

definition of the sex-gender system as "the set of arrangements by which a society transforms biological
sexuality into the products of human activity and in which these transformed sexual needs are satisfied."
"bid. 2.
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here not only men and women confronted each other, but also the
colonizers and the colonized."26
The "customary" law which emerged was a customary law which
had been absorbed by the state. "The state's production of a customary
law was a fundamental and powerful intervention in the way in which
African life could and would develop under white rule," says Martin
Chanock, who concludes:
African tribal authorities and family heads in the countries around
South Africa, and inside it, needed the weight of state power to
enforce the customary family law. Without thispower the practices
of young men and women, of divorcees and widows, all of whom
struggled against aspects27of the maintainedpatriarchy,would be
clearly visible as custom.

Because of the need in pre-capitalist societies for the "accumulation of
people, rather than the accumulation of things, 2 the control of
central importance.
assumed
their fertility
women and
Characteristically, the vehicle for such control was marriage.
[M]en exchanged cattle for women ...[an exchange which].. .was,
however, conditional on the bride remaining obedient to her
husband and proving fertile in the marriage. "[O]bedience" meant
that the wife had to fulfill her function as an agricultural producer
within her husband's homestead: "fertility" meant that she had to
produce children whose labor would, in time, be used for the
benefit of the homestead.29
Jeff Guy views this "cycle of production and reproduction"3 as being
at the heart of the region's pre-capitalist societies.

"'Jbid.
2
TChanock op cit n.13, 55 (emphasis added).
"8Jeff Guy, "Gender opression in Southern Africa's precapitalist societies" inC Walker op cit n.24 at
37, describing the situation in societies of simple technologies where the labour, mainly of women and
juniors, provided not only day-to-day sustenance but also protected the elderly against old age poverty.
'Ibid. 39.
'Ibid.
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III. Customary Law and Gender:
Identifying the Problem
Guy confirms the view that the overriding value in the African
family is reflected in the non-individual nature of marriage, sometimes
called the collective or communal aspect of the marriage relationship.
This notion embodies the idea of marriage as an alliance between two
kinship groups for purposes of realizing goals beyond the immediate
interests of the particular husband and wife. This does not mean that
the two parties are unimportant, they are, but only as the point at
which the two families, lineages or clans are joined for purposes which
have community-wide significance.
The goals aimed at by this type of marriage can be summarized as
procreation and survival. Both of these goals were essential for the
well-being of the larger group in pre-industrial society; wives and
children were an economic asset, and the rules that developed around
them were part of a survival strategy. It is clear therefore, that the
interests of the group were more important than those of the individual.
However, in patriarchal societies, group interests are framed in favor
of men, hence the first indication why inequality is such an enduring
part of African customary systems.
It is in the field of family relations in which Africans construct the
foundations of their social lives. Radcliffe-Brown's statement is as
valid today as it was in 1950.
For the understanding of any aspect of the social life of an African
people-economic, political or religious-it is essential to have a
thorough knowledge of their system of kinship and marriage. 3
If that system masks inequality under the guise of group interests,
women and children (lacking a say in the articulation of those interests)
are certain to be disadvantaged.
Because marriage is a tool in service of purposes much broader
than the immediate interests of the couple, there are certain

"AR Radcliffe-Brown, "Introduction" in AR Radcliffe-Brown and D Forde (eds), African Systems qf
Kinship and Marriage, Oxford University Press, London (1950) I.
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consequences that flow from this arrangement, which can be illustrated
by some examples:
(i)
The need to procreate leads to a complex of rules relating to
barrenness. The sororate, for instance, covers the situation where a
younger sister is required to take the place of a wife who is unable to
produce children. The levirate may be invoked in the case where a
man dies before he has fully exploited the procreative capacities of his
wife: he can have children fathered for him (more properly, for his
family) by a relative.32
(ii) The same view of marriage countenances child betrothal and
"forced marriage." Unfortunately, it countenances attitudes towards
nubility which sometimes clothe the taking of sexual liberties with the
very young with some measure of acceptability. The respect-for-elders
ethic and the ability of the perpetrator to plead customary rights such
as his preferential claim to young sisters and cousins of his wife,
combine to render this issue notoriously resistant to penetration by the
"white man's laws" of sexual propriety.33
(iii) It may also be argued that a marriage where most important
aims are external to the parties involved, where men acquire rights over
women and children but not vice versa, and where these rights are
secured by the movement of cattle, has a direct bearing on the
perpetual minority of women. This in turn surely has a bearing on
chastisement and physical violence in general, the position of widows,
and the sometimes dehumanizing bereavement rituals and mourning
taboos to which they may be subjected.
Therefore, it is family law that has to be scrutinized. But notions
about the family are so deeply embedded in African society that one
must make the distinction between pre-colonial customary law and
what is applied today, sometimes called "official" customary law.

2

Nhlapo, T. Marriage and Divorce in Swazi Law and Custom, Websters, Mbabane, Swaziland (1992)

76.

3Nhlapo, T. "The African Family and Women's Rights: Friends or Foes," Acta Juridica (1991) 135
at 138. On the effects of 'respect for elders' or consent to sexual intercourse by young girls, see A.K.A.
Armstrong "A Note on Several Aspects of Rape in Swaziland," 19 Comparative and International Law
Journal of Southern Africa (1986) 474.

THIRD WORLD LEGAL STUDIES-1994
A. Consequences of "Official" Customary Law
(1) Patriarchy
African law and custom had always been pervaded by the principle
of patriarchy, the superior status enjoyed by all senior males in society.
With the distortion of some customs and practices over the years, rules
were entrenched which affirmed this principle, even where the original
custom had either been relatively egalitarian or restricted by checks and
balances in favor of women and the young.34
(2) Strengthening the Public/PrivateDivide
Distorted customary law also solidified the separation between the
two spheres of life, public and private. Enthroning the head of
household as the only true person in law, the holder of family property
and civic status, rendered the children, wives, unmarried sons and
daughters in his household invisible in a social and legal sense. This
facilitated the division of labor which identified men with the public
sphere (chieftainship, politics, judicial work) and women with the
domestic sphere.35
(3) Women as "Outlaws"
Legislating these misconstructions of African life had the effect of
placing women "outside the law." Identifying the head of household
as the only person with property-holding capacity without
acknowledging the rights of wives, for instance, to security of tenure
on (and use of) land was a major distortion. Similarly, enacting the socalled perpetual minority of women as positive law when in the precolonial context everybody under the household-head was a minor
(including unmarried sons, and even married sons who had not yet
established a separate residence), had a profound and deleterious effect

4
Armstrong, Alice et al "Uncovering Reality: Excavating Women's Rights in African Family Law,"
7 International Journal of Law and the Family (1993) 314 at 324-8.
"Ibid.
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on the lives of African women. They were deprived of the
circumstances in which the subtle interplay of social norms enabled
them to manipulate the rules to their advantage, and yet they were not
brought within the protections of the formal legal order. They became
truly "outlaws."36
Therefore, even as one views with sympathy African notions of
family (an institution noted for its traditional solidarity and
supportiveness) one must realize that contemporary reality favors a
certain cynicism about what purports to be customary law today.
Protection from these distortions masquerading as African custom is
imperative, especially for the weaker members of society, namely
women and children.
Thus I have outlined only broad categories, to show the nature of
the problem in the abstract. Any enumeration of specific problems
relating to women and customary law would include:
-

land tenure
administrative justice
chiefs' courts
freedom of movement
property-holding capacity
political rights

Family law alone generates a vast array of problem areas, which
include:

-

marriageable age
grounds for divorce
lobolo
polygamy
legal capacity
personal status
maintenance

" May, Joan, Zimbabwean Woman in Customary and Colonial Law, Mambo Press, Gweru, Zimbabwe
(1983) 40. Citing the dictionary meaning of "outlaw" as "a person deprived of the protection of the law."
May observes: "The far-reaching social changes since the beginning of the colonial period...have to a large
extent destroyed the flexibility of the village system, and women now find themselves as virtual "outlaws"
without formal or judicial rights in a formal society which puts these at a premium."
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-

custody and guardianship

The primary problem for women is that customary law, as it functions
today, is fundamentally incompatible with section 8 of the interim
constitution-the equality and non-discrimination clause.37
IV. Customary Law and the Bill of Rights: What Next?
The points raised earlier demonstrate that customary law poses
some problems for gender equality; what legal system does not?3" In
the South African constitutional context, the problem is two-fold: the
operation of customary law practices in a society where equality and
non-discrimination are guaranteed rights, and the recognition of cultural
diversity itself as a protected value in the constitution. Therefore
practices and rules that contradict the equality argument may
simultaneously stake a strong claim to protection under the culture
argument. The feminists and the traditionalists are vindicated: the fears
that had mobilized each group during the constitutional negotiations
were well founded.
Because the constitution offers no guidance as to how these
conflicts might be resolved, we have to consider a range of possible
approaches. One set of alternatives, exemplified by the work of
Christina Murray and Felicity Kaganas,39 and Cathi Albertyn,4 °
would have explicit language in the Constitution stating that in the
31t may be incompatible with other provisions as well, but whether it survives or dies will depend
largely on the outcome of the "one-on-one" clash with the notion of equality.
"The Roman-Dutch law has been bedevilled by the marriage in community of property for many
years. In this type of marriage the husband acquired the marital power over the person and property of his
wife, with devastating results on her locus standi injudicio, her legal capacity to contract and her ability
to make decisions in relation to property. The last vestiges of this power were removed only recently, with
the passage of the General Law Fourth Amendment Act 132 of 1993 and even so, doubts remain about
some of the remnants of the marital power. See June Sinclair "Family Rights" in Van Wyk et al (eds)
Rights and Constitutionalism (1994) Juta Cape Town 520-21. The point is that even when criticism of the
marital power was at its most vociferous, no suggestion was ever made that the whole of Roman-Dutch
law should be abolished as a result. The problem was felt to be one which could be solved once the
political will to enact the necessary legislation was there. It is a point worth bearing in mind in addressing
calls for the abolition of customary law.
""The Contest Between Culture and Gender Equality Under South Africa's Interim Constitution"
(1994) Journal of Law and Society 409-431 at 417.
4
""'Women and the Transition to Democracy in South Africa," 1994 Acta Juridica 39-63 at 59-60.
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event of a conflict between culture and the equality clause, the latter
should prevail. In the absence of such language, Kaganas and Murray
argue convincingly that "the Constitution as a whole is founded upon
and informed by the principle of equality"4 and that "the equality
provision should override cultural claims and.. .cultural practices should
be subject to it."42
An opposing school of thought, reflecting the traditionalist stance
adopted by chiefs at the Multiparty Negotiating Process, still hopes for
a final constitution in which customary law will operate outside of the
bill of rights. The chances of such a provision being inserted into the
constitution are slim. At the other extreme, calls for the total abolition
of customary law are occasionally heard.43 The whole debate is
overheated due to the strong emotional waves that are generated by
discussions of culture. The following summary by T W Bennett
encapsulates this:
By implicitly recognizing customary law, and at the same time
prohibiting gender discrimination, the Constitution has brought
about a head-on confrontation between two opposed
cultures-admittedly a confrontation that has long been gathering
force. Because African culture is pervaded by the principle of
patriarchy.. .the gender equality clause now threatens a thoroughgoing purge of customary law. And it is tempting to dramatize this
threat, to portray human rights as the harbinger of western neoimperialism and to represent customary law as the shield of an
endangered indigenous culture. Such imagery encourages one to
think that conflicts will be overwhelming and irreconcilable; but if
a working relationship between conflicting norms is to be found, a
less polemical approach must be found."
It is the attempt to find that "working relationship" which takes up
the rest of this paper. For the attempt to be meaningful, it is important
that it should shift the terms of the debate away not only from the
polemic described by Bennett, but also from a mindset which seems to
4

Op cit n.39, 416.
bid. 417.
4
'See n.47 below.
14TW Bennett, "The Equality Clause and Customary Law" (1994) 10 South African Journalof-Human
Rights 122-130 at 123.
42
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be no different today from that which characterized the colonists and
missionaries of over a century ago.45
V. Customary Law and Human 46Rights:
Reconstructing the Debate
It is possible to detect in the present debate some worrying
tendencies which apparently seek to seize the opportunity offered by
constitution-making to entrench a value system based on "universal"
norms even in the face of strong misgivings from ordinary South
Africans. 47 This is a trend that has the potential for greater social
division than is commonly realized. I have written elsewhere4" that
it would be a mistake in the South African context to allow the debate
to deteriorate into "European" versus "non-European" finger pointing.
Whilst this may be inevitable in view of our grim history of racial
hostility, the post-apartheid reality is that it would be shortsighted to
let it happen.
There are good reasons why South Africans must modernize; there
are equally good reasons why many African people expect their culture
to receive more, not less, respect in the new South Africa. South
Africans should therefore embark upon the renegotiation of a new

45

Martin Chanock op cit n.13, 53 makes the point that there is a striking similarity between the present
debate over customary law and the controversies of the "great turning-point" of 1927. The point is echoed
by lain Currie op cit n.22, 152, who argues that "there is every reason to expect that current debate will
take the shape of past controversies."
"'The phrase is inspired by Chanock's section, ibid., entitled "Constructing the Debate."
47
The cautious tone of the statement is simply dictated by the fact that this is not an easy allegation
to establish by hard evidence. Personal experiences as a technical adviser in the service of the
Constitutional Assembly (a task which involves total immersion in the submissions sent by private
individuals, political parties and other organizations), and a general monitoring of trends in the media
(editorials, letter columns, radio and television talk shows) leave one with a distinct impression of a society
visibly beginning to divide along lines determined by allegiance to one or other of the cultures commonly
described as "Western" and "non-Western." The tone of the arguments suggests a growing impatience on
the part of the Westerner with the non-Westerner's slowness in embracing "progressive" norms. Such
attitudes have been in evidence mostly in the debates about abortion, corporal punishment in schools,
traditional leadership and marriage laws.
4
"T Nhlapo, "Culture and Women Abuse: Some South African Starting Points" (1992) 13 AGENDA
5-13; "Women, Culture and a Bill of Rights in South Africa" in V Maphai (ed) South Africa: The
Challenge of Change (1994) SAPES Books, Harare 184-201.
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value system; such an exercise demands that the competing cultural
packages start out as at least notionally equal.
Over the years African values in mainstream society have been
conspicuous by their absence.4 9 The reasons have had more to do
with ignorance, arrogance and paternalism on the part of the colonial
and, later, the apartheid authorities than with any inherent moral defect
in the indigenous world-view. The latter is simply a world-view born
of a particular set of historical, economic, political and environmental
circumstances and is capable of adaptation and development.
The political danger that lurks in the current debate is the
possibility of a backlash from some African quarters, which might take
the form of withholding recognition and therefore legitimating of both
the process of constitution-making and its substance.5" A blind and
hegemonic push for uniformity around a non-African standard would
simply fuel resentments that have been simmering since colonial times.
There is a way out of the dilemma. What is required is an
imaginative fusion of South Africa's diverse51 world-views with the
aim of enriching the social, political and legal culture. In that fusion,
a clear commitment to human rights (as enunciated in the constitution)
must be matched by a demonstrated52 commitment to cultural
diversity as well. This can be achieved when we learn to call for the
abolition of certain cultural rules and practices only when they are

4

From the overwhelmingly wide usage of English Christian names to the lasting popularity of
American imagery and art in the media and in entertainment, South Africa has been and continues to be
very Westernized.
5"There is already evidence that the largest organization of traditional leaders, CONTRALESA, is
unhappy not only at the speed with which the government is pushing towards local elections in rural areas,
but also at the failure to set up the Council of Traditional Leaders as provided in the Constitution. This
is the body that should be ratifying all decisions taken at the Constitutional Assembly regarding traditional
leaders: that it does not yet exist puts a question mark over the decisions so far taken.
"in a paper on African customary law it obviously makes sense to emphasize the African world-view.
It must be pointed out, though, that Muslim, Hindu and other cultural and religious interests have exactly
the same claims to consideration in the constitution-making process. It is hoped that the case-study chosen
to illustrate this paper's proposals, the question of polygyny, will highlight issues that go beyond African
customary law.
2
The public relations benefits of being seen to take African cultural practices seriously should not be
underestimated. Since the processes of modernization in the past have not showed much respect for the
African viewpoint, today's reformer needs to demonstrate a break with that old tradition. This is what I
have referred to elsewhere as "disinfecting the platform from which we wish to launch social criticisms,"
AGENDA op cit n.40, 11.
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harmful and not merely unfamiliar or inconvenient. I will attempt to
make the point by using polygamy as an illustration.
VI. Living with Polygamy

53

in a Non-Sexist Democracy

From the earliest times of contact between Europeans and
indigenous African societies, the former made clear their abhorrence of
polygamy.54 Believed to be incompatible with the Christian form of
marriage, polygamy was condemned by missionaries and colonial
officials alike. An 1872 Commission on the Laws and Customs of the
Basotho" heard the following evidence from missionaries:
Cattle-marriages mean polygamy, they mean systematic sensualism
and immorality. 6 Take them away, and the whole fabric is
broken in pieces, -the
native heathen custom becomes
meaningless, -polygamy
becomes impossible, -woman
is
emancipated, -virtue, truth and honor cease to be empty names....
If we wish to reconstitute the family on the Christian mode...there
must be no compromise with this embodiment of evil, this traffic
in souls, this chain of bondage....

"This is an unnecessarily "high risk" example: one could have chosen a subject such as lobolo
(bridewealth) which is attended by far less emotion and passion to illustrate the point. The justification
is that it is precisely the "high risk" example which pushes the argument to its limits. Urging an
accommodation of polygyny among people who abhor the institution will at least test how close the society
is to taking cultural diversity seriously.
5"We confine our discussion to polygamy, the type of marriage where a man marries more than one
woman; polyandry, the system allowing awoman to have more than one husband, is not addressed except
in passing.
"The Commission was set up by the Cape Government; its deliberations are cited in SM Poulter
Family Law and Litigation in Basotho Society (1976) Clarendon Press Oxford 65.
"'It is sometimes not fully appreciated that, in European eyes, the most objectionable aspect of polygny
was not gender inequality in the abstract: it was the "easy sexual access" or "promiscuity" that was
presumed to be the reason for existence of the institution. In short, polygyny embarrassed white people,
many of whom were steeped in the repressed sexual morality of Victorian England where, historians tell
us, it was common to cover the legs of tables and chairs in order to protect the mind from salacious
thoughts. Cherryl Walker, decrying the dearth of research into how the sex-gender system of the
nineteenth century was fashioned, noted: "The interaction of the values imported mainly (but not
exclusively) from Victorian England with those of already established Dutch-speaking communities, in a
backward, racially stratified society, remains an under-researched subject." Op cit, n.2 I at 11. Under these
circumstances it is genuinely difficult to take European criticisms of polygyny from a moral standpoint
seriously.
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Welsh" cites the views of one colonist who believed that polygamy
destroys all love between man and wife-it encourages war as a
means of procuring cattle to pay for the panders to their lust58 and
idleness; and by a fearful destruction of life, brings about an
inequality of the sexes.
Others describe polygamy as a gross evil, akin to "habitual murder or
59
slavery."
Contemporary writers, while less ethnocentric in attitude and
strident in tone, remain uneasy about the institution, arguing that it
reflects obvious inequality between men and women. Alternatively,
they assume its unsuitability in a "modern" democratic state is selfevident, and, consequently, that it cannot survive a bill of rights. Albie
Sachs6" who typifies this view, favors the "universalization of certain
family-law concepts, permitting a broad degree of freedom to pursue
religious and cultural practices, but laying down certain common
norms," one of which should be monogamy.
Torquil Paterson, 6 writing on the difference between a common
law -marriage and a customary "union," shares Sachs' view.
Applauding a trend in judicial decisions which moved the two kinds of
marriage closer together he concludes:
If customary unions are to be recognized, then a quidpro quo will
be necessary to ensure that customary unions conform to some of
the formalities and legal incidents of the common law marriage,
particularly with respect to polygamy.
He gives no reason for this conclusion except that it

"D Welsh The Roots of Segregation: Native Policy in Colonial Natal 1845-1910 2ed (1973) OUP
Cape Town 69.
HIt is interesting to note that, again, lust appears before inequality in the list of objections. See n.48.
"Cited in A Hastings Christian Marriage in Africa (1973) Hoken Street Press London 15.
"See, for example, "The Constitutional Position of the Family in a Democratic South Africa" in A
Sachs, Protecting Human Rights in a New South Africa (1990) Oup Cape Town 64 at 72.
"ils there still a difference between the common law marriage and the customary union?," 109 (1992)
South African Law Journal 21.
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would be detrimental to the law if too many exceptions to the
common law are created so as to cloud the underlying reasons for
not recognizing customary unions.
These views are not without their defects. They range from the
unquestioning belief of the missionary and the colonist in the
superiority of Christian values and nineteenth century West European
sexual morality, to the modem reformer's failure to explain why
monogamy is necessarily inferior to polygamy. The problem of the
former group was racism; the problem of the latter is an incautious
human rights advocacy
sometimes based on unwarranted
62
assumptions.
A preferable approach is the one adopted by Felicity Kaganas and
Christina Murray in their important article Law, Women and the
Family: the Question of Polygamy in a new South Africa.63
Proceeding from an explicitly feminist standpoint, the authors set out
to analyze the institution of polygamy to find out whether it is
"fundamentally incompatible with a democratic social order and, more
specifically, inevitably.. .oppressive to women. ' 64 They analyze the
many reasons given for the belief that polygamy denies equality to
women and find that the only one that is really about polygamy is the
right of the husband to [unilaterally] introduce more wives to the
household, while the wife cannot introduce more husbands. In other
words, the man "has many opportunities to marry while each wife may
6
have only one, shared husband. 1
Kaganas and Murray dismiss the argument that "there is something
inherently unequal in a family structure which comprises one man and
many women" as dubious, 66 pointing out that the "apparently
symmetrical relationship of one woman to one man" may not

".See T Nhlapo, "Cultural Diversity, Human Rights and the Family in Contemporary Africa: Lessons
from the South african Constitutional Debate," International Journal of Laig and the Family 9 (1995) 208225 on the problems surrounding human rights advocacy in non-Western cultural contexts.
"(1991) Acta Juridica 116-134.
'Albid. 119.
650p cit n.55, 127. Many of the other objections relate to the institution of
customary marriage in

general.
"Ibid.
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necessarily be the only formula guaranteeing equality within
marriage." As for the "one man, many women" format being a
violation of the right to equality they comment: "But one can hardly
suggest seriously that feminist objections to polygamy would be
addressed if women were given the same opportunities as men to
accumulate spouses."68
Their conclusion that,
The treatment of women as property, sexual stereotyping and
domination are not limited to polygamy, nor are they practices that
can be shown to be inevitable in polygamy69
leaves the impression that an honest effort has been made to understand
the institution in a deep sense, and to subject its elements to serious,
dispassionate scholarly analysis. The immediate offshoot of such an
approach, in South Africa's culturally diverse circumstances, is to
invite proponents of polygamy and other neutral observers (who may
nevertheless have been irked by superficial condemnations of the
institution) to engage the views expressed with equal seriousness. The
conditions for a real debate are fulfilled. The way is open to a
productive discussion of the issues and the usual non-debate,
characterized by evangelizing on the one hand and instinctive
defensiveness on the other, is avoided.
There is a way in which South African society, across the ethnic
spectrum, can be persuaded that the energy expended in fulminating
against polygamy amounts to "much ado about nothing." In the first
place, though polygamy remains problematic from a gender relations
perspective,7 ° the case for the full recognition of customary marriage
is now so uncontested 7 that recognition may have to come in spite of
'71bid.
I81bid.
6"Op cit n.63, 128.
"Kaganas and Murray identify patriarchy and not polygamy as the culprit but make the point that
polygamy plays an important supportive role, facilitating "stereotyping and the objectification of women
to a greater extent that monogamy does" (128, 134).
"See for example, TW Bennett Human Rights and African Customary Law (1995) Juta Cape Town
114: "A nation dedicated to eradicating discrimination and to encouraging cultural pluralism should offer
all marriages equal recognition, an obligation which is implicit in the constitutional right of all South
Africans to participate in the culture of their choice." See also Paragraph 11.2 of the South African Law
Commission's Report on Marriages and Customary Unions of Black Persons which stated bluntly that "the
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polygamy rather than contingent upon monogamy. The state's duty to
uphold fundamental rights is clear; the question whether polygamy (as
opposed to other forms of marriage) violates those rights is, to my
mind, unresolved.
Apart from the concern expressed by Kaganas and Murray that
symbolically polygamy has become so associated with the oppression
of women that its retention may be incompatible with a social order in
which the liberation of women is a recognized goal,72 there does not
appear to be any compelling single ground for its abolition. There are
legitimate misgivings, in the same way that there are legitimate
misgivings about the income tax system or the high divorce rate in
civil marriage. Since people in general seem willing to live with the
latter concerns, it would require persuasive arguments to justify
targeting an African practice for abolition on the basis of misgivings,
however legitimate.
The point can be put in another way. To every argument against
polygamy there is an equally plausible response. To the objection that
the man has a right, not shared by the woman, to introduce other wives
into the household unilaterally the response is that the consent of the
first wife to such a move should be made a mandatory requirement.73
This would come as no surprise to those peoples, like the Zulu and the
Swazi, where in ideal custom such consent was always an essential
aspect. Other arguments are simply weak, such as the objection that
a woman who has to share a husband is deprived of love and therefore
disadvantaged. That that might well be the case in a society in which
romantic love (and particular modes of expressing it) are highly valued;
we have no right to assume that this is true of all societies on earth.
Ware is correct when she points out that "whether one considers that

customary marriage should be recognised as a marriage and not merely as an institution of customary law."
'2Kaganas and Murray op cit n.63, 129.
"Where we "mistrust" the woman's consent because we are worrying that it is unlikely that it was
either free or informed, we should mistrust consent in relation to a civil marriage as well. Both marriages
operate in a male-dominated world and we have no way of quantifying the true effects of social and
financial pressures on anybody's decision to get married. Moreover, as Kaganas and Murray observe on
this point, "But this means that the problem lies in the society in which polygyny is practised rather than
the institution itself' (128).
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women who have to share a husband are underprivileged depends on
74
the value placed upon husbands.
In the final analysis the issue revolves around a willingness to live
with the practices of "others" which are unfamiliar or seen as
abhorrent. In political terms, the time has passed when "public
policy... [was].. .equated with the policy of the dominant white group
and the teachings and/or cultural habits of the disenfranchised
majority.. .[were]...largely ignored."75 In the leading case of Seedat's
Executors v The Master (Natal) the court held that no country was
obliged to recognize a legal relationship that was "repugnant to the
moral principles of its people"76 and accordingly declared a potentially
polygamous Muslim marriage contracted abroad to be invalid in South
Africa. Whatever the learned judge conceived of as the "country's
people" in 1917, today the net would be cast somewhat wider in
describing the "people" whose morality were being considered in
making public policy decisions.
Scant attention has been paid to the glaring inconsistency that
could result if the South African parliament recognized the customary
marriage and attached the condition of monogamy to such recognition.
Trends in family law suggest that the concept of "family" is undergoing
profound changes and is the subject of scrutiny and challenge in the
Western world.77 Divorce, single parenting, cohabitation have all
become commonplace over the last thirty years. Emerging pressures
on the "traditional" concept of the family include pressures from samesex couples to marry, to adopt children and generally to be treated as
families. These trends are not far-fetched in relation to South
Africa.78
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H Ware, "Polygyny: women's views in a transitional society, Nigeria 1985" (1979) 41 Journalof
Marriage and the Family 194.
"Alick Costa, "Polygamy, other personal relationships and the Constitution," De Rebus (December
1994) 915-916.
71917 AD 302 at 307-8 (emphasis added).
77See A Glendon The New Family and the New Property (1981) Butterworth & Co, Canada.
7
XA report in the Sunday 'rimes newspaper of 13 August 1995 told the story of a homosexual couple
who were granted the right to adopt a child in Gauteng, on the basis of the non-discrimination provisions
in section 8 of the Constitution. Chanock op cit n.12, 65 says: "Family law in the western world has
increasingly been moving in the direction of closing the gap between legally formed marriages and defacto
relationships." See also A Costa op cit n.67, who argues for the legalization of the marriages of
homosexuals.
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Would it not be the supreme irony if, under the pressure of trends
from the First World, we were seen to be moving towards greater
flexibility in our conception of family forms, but remained resolutely
judgmental in respect of an indigenous form in which a man could
have more than one- spouse? Given the fact, noted by Kaganas and
Murray, that such a relationship could be perfectly consentual (where
the agreement of the other wives has been obtained), the state's refusal
to grant it at least equal consideration with emerging forms of familial
organization would be very revealing as to which value system was
considered to be "irrelevant" in South Africa.79
VII. Conclusion
This paper has attempted to demonstrate that a commitment to
human rights can go hand in hand with a commitment to cultural
diversity. The argument advanced is that there are good practical
reasons why, despite the unequal influence of the two world-views
(Western and African), a notional equality should be attributed to both,

as a starting point. Not to do so has the potential of opening old
wounds by failing to acknowledge past interference in the culture of

South africa's indigenous population.
It is suggested further that the ideal of gender equality need not be
compromised in the process. Where cultural practices compete for

711sometimes suspect that the problem is one of perceptions socialized into us from birth: it seems
"natural" to picture a cosy family named Smith in suburbia, with Mr and Mrs Smith running a warm and

loving home in which they are raising happy, contented and well-adjusted future citizens. For some
reason, the image falls to pieces when we are asked to picture a cosy rural homestead where Mr Dlamini
or Mr Mokoena and two wives live and work in a warm and loving environment, raising happy, contented
and well-adjusted future citizens. We dismiss out of hand the possibility that many ordinary, productive
South Africans can truthfully say: "I grew up in a polygynous household and to me it was perfectly
normal. I had two mothers and therefore twice the care and attention. As children we moved freely
between two 'houses'; it does not seem to have done us any permanent harm." The problem is that, when
we feel moved to make comparisons, we do not compare apples with apples. We tend to put up a good
civil or Christian marriage against a bad customary marriage, as if "goodness" in the latter category is not
possible until those marriages acquire some recognizably western characteristics. The same reason blinds
us to questions of divorce in civil marriage (see CMR Dlamini, "The Role of Customary Law in Meeting
Social Needs" (1991) Acta Juridica 71-85 at 76, who refers to it as "serial polygyny"). From the deafening
silence on the subject of divorce and remarriage one must assume that this raises no moral questions, while
sharing a home with several spouses does. Dlamini is correct when he notes that such blatantly selective
morality is "puzzling" to many Africans.
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public acceptability, the decision to prefer one over the other should
not depend on an assertion of the moral superiority of the value system
of a particular group in society.
The sensitive issue of polygamy was used in this essay because of
its emotive value. If the practice can be confronted, and a conclusion
reached that despite perceived abhorrence, the case for its abolition has
not been made, then we are closer to internalizing an important lesson
in democracy, namely, that the constitution protects our right not to be
oppressed or ill-treated, not necessarily our preference not to be
embarrassed or inconvenienced by the behavior of others.

